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Abstract
We use recently developed approaches in argumentation theory in order to
revamp the hypothetico-deductive model of confirmation, thus alleviating the
well-known paradoxes the H-D account faces. More specifically, we introduce
the concept of dialectic confirmation on the background of the so-called theory
of dialectical structures [Betz, 2010, 2011]. Dialectic confirmation generalises
hypothetico-deductive confirmation and mitigates the raven paradox, the grue
paradox, the tacking paradox, the paradox from conceptual difference, and the
problem of novelty.
1 Introduction
According to the hypothetico-deductive account of confirmation, a scientific hypoth-
esis is confirmed by its true deductive implications, in particular by its true empirical
consequences. Thus, a successful prediction lends, for example, evidential support
to the theory that entailed it. While the H-D model was spelled out and championed
by logical positivists, it had figured prominently in the history of the philosophy of
science before, being advocated, e.g., by scholars such as John Herschel and Stanley
Jevons [c.f. Losee, 2001]. Yet, as we will review below, the H-D account of confirma-
tion faces systematic objections to the effect that it is nowadays largely dismissed
as indefensible. Notwithstanding this criticism, the H-D model seems to provide an
adequate description of historical as well as current scientific practice, as its oppo-
nents admit [e.g. Glymour, 1980, p. 48]. Moreover, today’s mainstream theory of
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confirmation, i.e. Bayesianism, cites in its favour its ability to give a justification
of hypothetico-deductive methods [Talbott, 2008, Howson and Urbach, 1989, p. 82].
Thus, a defence of the H-D model may still be worthwhile.
This paper takes on the challenge, arguing that hypothetico-deductivism pro-
vides yet an attractive outlook on empirical confirmation. In particular, it shows
how recent developments in argumentation theory can be used to refine the simple
H-D model so as to avoid the diverse objections which have been put forward against
it.
The overall argument this paper unfolds proceeds as follows. The view that a hy-
pothesis is confirmed by its true deductive implications gives rise to a bunch of well-
known problems. Section 2 briefly reports these objections hypothetico-deductivism
faces. The revamp of the H-D account that aims at circumventing those problems is
couched within a specific argumentation-theoretic framework: The so-called theory
of dialectical structures, being introduced in section 3. On the background of that
framework, section 4 puts forward a dialectic notion of confirmation which modifies
the simple H-D account. The concept of dialectic confirmation, we argue in section
5, allows one to solve the paradoxes outlined in section 2.
2 Problems of hypothetico-deductivism
Raven paradox. Consider the hypothesis H that all ravens are black and let
a be an individual raven.1 Clearly, H implies that a is black. According to the
hypothetico-deductive account of confirmation, observing that a is black therefore
confirms H. Likewise, the hypothesis H ′ that all non-black things are non-ravens is
confirmed by verifying that some non-black object b is not a raven, but, e.g., a green
leaf. Yet, the hypothesis H ′ is logically equivalent with H. Given that any two
logically equivalent hypotheses are supported by the very same evidence, verifying
that the green object b is a leaf should also confirm H. But that, or so it seems, is
not the case: H does not speak of green things at all, let alone leaves, so how could
1Originally discussed by Hempel [1945, p. 11] as a problem of the instantial model of confirmation,
the raven paradox represents an objection to the H-D account in general, because every instantial
confirmation amounts to a hypothetico-deductive one [Lipton, 2004, p. 16]. See also Fitelson and
Hawthorne [2010] for a recent review and a Bayesian response to the problem.
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it be confirmed by observing a green leaf?
Grue paradox. As Goodman [1983, pp. 73ff.] has famously argued, the hypothe-
sis that all emeralds are green implies exactly the same available empirical data (as
of today) as the hypothesis which states that all emeralds are grue—where grue is
the property of being green and being observed before some future point in time t or
being blue and not being observed before t. According to the hypothetico-deductive
account, both hypotheses are equally confirmed by our available evidence. Yet this
is apparently not the case: We all (evidently rightly) infer, from our occasional
encounters with jewellery, that emeralds are green, not grue.
Tacking paradox. Whatever is implied by some hypothesis H is also implied
by the conjunction H&C, where C represents an arbitrary, possibly irrelevant or
even silly, claim. Thus, whatever confirms H, confirms, according to hypothetico-
deductivism, H&C as well.2 But this is, again, an absurd consequence. The ob-
servation of interference patterns confirms, for example, the wave-theory of light,
whereas it does not confirm the hypothesis conjoining the wave-theory of light and
the claim that humans are descended from kangaroos.
Paradox from conceptual difference. Consider two theoretical hypotheses, H1
and H2, that are empirically equivalent but conceptually distinct. Hypothetico-
deductivism has it, then, that the evidential support for H1 is the same as for
H2. But now assume: “H1, but not H2, is derivable from a more general theory
T , which also entails another hypothesis H. An empirical consequence e of H is
obtained. e supports H and thereby T . Thus e provides indirect evidential warrant
for H1, of which it is not a consequence, without affecting the credentials of H2.”
[Laudan, 1991, p. 464] In contradiction to hypothetico-deductivism, H1 and H2 are
not confirmed by the same items of evidence.
2This paradox is also referred to as the “problem of irrelevant conjunction” [cf. Glymour, 1980,
p. 31]. Provided the highly plausible views that (i) a statement confirms its deductive consequences
and that (ii) the confirmation relation is transitive, the tacking paradox gives rise to an additional
reductio: It follows that any piece of evidence, which confirms some statement at all, confirms every
statement whatsoever [e.g. Goodman, 1983, pp. 67-68].
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Figure 1: A dialectical structure with two complete positions attached. Truth values
are symbolised by “T” (true) and “F” (false).
Problem of novelty. According to the hypothetico-deductive account of confir-
mation, a hypothesis is confirmed by entailed items of evidence no matter when the
respective observations were made, or whether they were unexpected or not. As
a result, hypothetico-deductivism collides with the highly plausible view that new
and surprising predictions which turn out to be correct confirm a hypothesis H to
a higher degree than old, well-known evidence which is implied by H.3
3 Fundamentals of the theory of dialectical structures
A dialectical structure τ = 〈T,A,U〉 is a set of deductively valid arguments
(premiss-conclusion structure), T , on which an attack relation, A, and a support
relation, U , are defined as follows (a, b ∈ T ):
• A(a, b) :⇐⇒ a’s conclusion is contradictory to one of b’s premisses;
• U(a, b) :⇐⇒ a’s conclusion is equivalent to one of b’s premisses.4
3It is, in other words, not clear whether hypothetico-deductive accounts of confirmation can
avoid accomodationism.
4The theory of dialectical structures is more thoroughly developed in Betz [2010].
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Figure 2: A dialectical structure with one partial positions attached.
Complex debates—philosophical, political or scientific ones—can be reconstructed
as dialectical structures. Figure 1 depicts a purely formal example of a dialectical
structure. Numbers stand for sentences, and a negative number denotes the nega-
tion of the sentence which is designated by the corresponding positive integer. Each
box represents an argument or a thesis.5 Continuous and dashed arrows indicate
the support and attack relationship, respectively.
Relative to a dialectical structure τ , which in a sense depicts the state of a debate,
one can specify the positions of different proponents. We may, generally, distinguish
complete and partial positions. A complete position Q (a proponent can adopt)
on τ is a truth value assignment to all sentences which figure in arguments in T ,
i.e. Q : S → {t, f}, where S is the set of all sentences in τ . A partial position P
(a proponent can adopt) on τ is a truth value assignment to some sentences which
figure in arguments in T , i.e. P : S′ → {t, f}, where S′ ⊆ S. Whereas figure 1 shows
two complete positions defined on a dialectical structure, figure 2 gives an example
for a partial position defined on the very same debate.
5Introducing theses into the argument maps does not require one to modify the definition of a
dialectical structure. Formally, theses can simply be understood as arguments containing exactly
one premiss and a conclusion identical with that premiss.
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Partial positions can be combined. Let P1 : S1 → {t, f} and P2 : S2 → {t, f} be
two partial positions which agree on S1 ∩ S2. The conjunction of these positions,
(P1&P2) : S1 ∪ S2 → {t, f}, can be defined by,
p 7→
 P1(p) if p ∈ S1P2(p) if p ∈ S2 \ S1 .
Obviously, the arguments that make up a dialectical structure impose certain
constraints on what a proponent can reasonably assert. Not every complete or
partial position can rationally be adopted. Thus, a complete position Q on τ is
(dialectically) coherent if and only if
1. equivalent sentences are assigned the same truth value;
2. contradictory sentences are assigned complementary truth values;
3. if every premiss p of some argument a ∈ T is assigned the value “true”, then
a’s conclusion is assigned the value “true”, too.
A partial position P : S′ → {t, f} on τ is (dialectically) coherent if and only if it
can be extended to a complete position Q on τ (P = Q|S′) which is coherent.
Returning to the complete positions depicted in figure 1, we may note:
• The left-hand-side complete position in that example is coherent. It complies
with the coherence conditions set up above.
• The right-hand-side complete position is, however, not coherent. Yet, that
position does not merely defy one coherence constraint. Actually, all three
conditions are violated. Thus, the right-hand-side position violates constraint
(1) because the tokens of sentence 10 are assigned different truth values; it
violates constraint (2) because the contradictory sentences 3/-3 are both con-
sidered true; and it violates constraint (3) because the conclusion of argument
(4,7;-2) is false despite its premisses being true.
Moreover, the partial position shown in figure 2 is not coherent, either, since it
cannot be extended to a complete, coherent position. To see this, consider, first of
all, the argument (8,-3;2). Since premiss (8) is true and the conclusion (2) is false,
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the remaining premiss (-3) has to be false. Otherwise the complete position would
violate the third constraint. Secondly, in regard of argument (8,3;12), sentence (3)
must be false for analogous reasons. Yet (3) and (-3) cannot be false in the same time
because of the second constraint. Hence, the partial position cannot be extended to
a coherent complete position.
Based on these primitive notions, we can now introduce the concepts of dialectic
entailment and degree of partial entailment, which will play a major role in our
attempt to rephrase hypothetico-deductivism. Thus, a partial position P2 dialec-
tically entails a partial position P1, iff all coherent and complete positions which
extend P2 equally extend P1. The concept of dialectic entailment may be generalised
by following Wittgenstein’s basic idea in the Tractatus (and identifying cases with
complete and coherent positions on τ): The degree of partial entailment of a
partial position P1 by a dialectically coherent partial position P2, can be defined as,
Doj(P1|P2) := number of cases with P1 and P2
number of cases with P2
=
number of complete & coherent positions that
extend P1 and P2
number of complete & coherent positions that
extend P2
. (1)
As a consequence, Doj(P1|P2) = 1 if and only if P2 dialectically entails P1. Degrees
of partial entailment satisfy, under certain conditions which we shall assume to hold6,
the axioms of probability theory.7
6This is the problem: For every probability measure over a set of statements, it holds that
P (A∨B) = P (A) +P (B) for contrary A,B. Now assume that the three sentences A∨B, A and B
figure in some τ and that there is no dialectically coherent position according to which both A and
B are true. Still, this does not guarantee that the (unconditional) degrees of partial entailment of A
and B add up to the (unconditional) degree of partial entailment of A∨B. This is because not every
coherent complete position according to which A is true assigns A∨B the value “true”—unless an
argument like (A;A∨B) is included in τ . Thus, degrees of partial entailment satisfy the probability
axioms only if the respective dialectical structure is suitably augmented by simple arguments as
indicated.
7This is, however, not to say that the concept of degree of partial entailment represents a
theoretical explication of our pre-theoretical notion of probability (as in “It is very improbable that
she wins the national lottery”). The theory of dialectical structures is therefore not committed to
the assumption that all cases (i.e. positions) are equally distributed in the sense of being equally
likely.
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Finally, the degree of justification of a partial position P can be defined as
its degree of partial entailment from the empty set,
Doj(P) := Doj(P|∅) (2)
=
number of complete & coherent positions
that extend P
number of complete & coherent positions
. (3)
It can be shown that degrees of justification possess the following properties [cf.
Betz, 2011]:
• Introducing an independent8 argument that supports (attacks) some thesis t
increases (decreases) t’s degree of justification.
• Introducing an independent argument that supports (attacks) a supporting
argument for some thesis t increases (decreases) t’s degree of justification.
• Introducing an independent argument that supports (attacks) some argument
which attacks thesis t decreases (increases) t’s degree of justification.
• Incorporating premisses of independent arguments that support (attack) some
thesis t into the background knowledge increases (decreases) t’s degree of jus-
tification.
As the degree justification is an indicator of a partial position’s robustness, and
as it is reasonable to maximise the robustness of one’s position, a high degree of
justification points to the belief-worthiness of a position [cf. Betz, 2011].9
Degrees of justification, as defined above, are sensitive to changes in the di-
alectical structure which represents the reconstruction of a debate, e.g. a scientific
controversy. Far from being a disadvantage, it is precisely this dependency which
allows one to understand why the belief-worthiness, and the overall confirmation, of
a hypothesis might change in the course of an ongoing argumentation.
8i.e. an argument whose premisses are neither equivalent nor contradictory to any sentences
already contained in the debate.
9A formal investigation of the concept of degree of justification in Betz [forthcoming], based on
multi-agent simulations of debate dynamics, suggests that degrees of justification may also serve as
an indicator of truthlikeness. These results, if actually correct, could substantially strengthen this
paper’s dialectic defence of the H-D account.
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4 A dialectic account of confirmation
The degree of justification of some hypothesis H relative to a dialectical structure
and a given body of background knowledge largely determines H’s overall belief-
worthiness. If Doj(H) equals 1, H is true.10 If Doj(H) = 0, H is false. In
addition, the higher Doj(H), the more arguments count in favour of H, and the
less objections H faces. The overall belief-worthiness of H given some evidence
E is nothing but the conditional degree of justification Doj(H|E), i.e. H’s degree
of justification provided E is incorporated into the background knowledge. It is
straightforward to assess the confirmatory impact of E on H by comparing Doj(H)
and Doj(H|E). If, for instance, establishing E as true increases H’s degree of
justification, E inductively supports H. Thus,
E confirms H ⇐⇒ Doj(H|E)
Doj(H)
> 1,
E disconfirms H ⇐⇒ Doj(H|E)
Doj(H)
< 1,
E is neutral reg. H ⇐⇒ Doj(H|E)
Doj(H)
= 1.
The ratio Doj(H|E)/Doj(H) can be defined as the degree of confirmation
of H by E.11 It corresponds to the probabilistic ratio measure of confirmation
and gauges the relative increase of H’s degree of justification which results from
incorporating E into the body of background knowledge.12 The overall degree of
justification of H once the evidence E is verified, i.e. the belief-worthiness of H given
E and the state of the debate, trivially satisfies,
Doj(H|E) = Doj(H|E)
Doj(H)
×Doj(H), (4)
10It is tacitly understood that all degrees of justification are determined relative to some body of
background assumptions, B, without making this explicit.
11This ratio is undefined if Doj(H) = 0. But note that Doj(H) = 0 implies Doj(H|E) = 0.
The degree of justification of a hypothesis whose falsehood is implied by the background knowledge
cannot be increased by augmenting the background knowledge.
12This said, the ratio measure represents, obviously, only one among many alternative ways for
defining quantitative degrees of confirmation in a probabilistic way [see, e.g., Fitelson, 1999]. This
paper, however, is content by resolving the paradoxes of the H-D account based on the ratio measure.
It remains to be studied how different measures of confirmation behave in the dialectic framework.
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and thus depends on (i) the degree of confirmation of H by E, and (ii) the prior
degree of justification ofH irrespective of E. These are the two directions from where
support in favour of some hypothesis might generally stem. Evidential support, on
the one side, as well as theoretical support “from above” [cf. Hempel, 1966, pp. 38-
40], on the other side, both increase a hypothesis’ overall degree of justification.
Consequently, the degree of confirmation of H by some evidence is not the only
indicator for whether H is highly justified and belief-worthy.13
Note that degrees of justification as well as degrees of confirmation can be calcu-
lated, given some dialectical structure, for arbitrary pairs of hypotheses and items
of evidence. As a consequence, the dialectic account allows one
• to distinguish the confirmatory relevance of different pieces of evidence for a
given hypothesis, as well as
• to determine the specific evidential support some empirical data bestows on
different hypotheses, e.g. different parts of a complex theory.
This account thus settles a major short-coming of the simple H-D model of confir-
mation which Glymour [1980, pp. 30ff.] rightly identifies.
In terms of mathematical structure, the dialectic account set forth so far closely
resembles Bayesian Confirmation Theory. So, in which sense does it represent a
revamp of the H-D account at all? Besides being based on a fully deductive ar-
gumentation framework, the dialectic account generalises the key tenet of the H-D
model, namely that a hypothesis is confirmed by its deductive implications.14 For
according to the dialectic model, a hypothesis is confirmed by those statements it
13Thus, we clearly distinguish (a) the overall degree of belief-worthiness of a hypothesis and (b)
the degree of confirmation of that hypothesis by some evidence. Larry Laudan once remarked
that “‘possessing the same positive instances’ and ‘being equally well confirmed’ boil down to
the same thing only in the logician’s never-never land. (It was Whewell, Peirce and Popper who
taught us all that theories sharing the same positive instances need not be regarded as equally well
tested or equally belief-worthy.)” [Laudan, 1990, 282-283]. Whilst we don’t consider the theory
exposed in this section a Neverland’s account of confirmation in the first place, the desideratum
Laudan articulates, namely to differentiate empirical consequences on the one hand and overall
belief-worthiness on the other hand, is clearly met.
14It concurs, in this respect, with previous, non-Bayesian attempts to defend the H-D account
against the paradoxes (reviewed in improved upon by Sprenger [2011a,b]), which replaced the
classic concept of logical entailment—originally used to articulate hypothetico-deductivism—by a
(weaker) notion of relevant implication [e.g. Schurz, 1991, Gemes, 1993, 1994, 2005]. Now, instead
of developing a formal notion of relevant entailment, this paper employs the concept of partial
dialectic entailment as a substitute for logical entailment.
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partially entails (to a certain, sufficient degree). More precisely, the degree of par-
tial entailment of E by H fully determines the degree of confirmation of H by E, as
follows directly from Bayes’ theorem.15
5 Resolving the problems
Raven paradox. We may begin our dialectical analysis of the raven paradox with
the obvious observation that the hypothesis H does not entail that there exists a
black raven. H does entail—provided the auxiliary assumption that a is a raven—
that a is black. Likewise, hypothesis H ′ does not entail that there exists a green
leaf. But it does entail—provided the auxiliary assumptions that (i) b is green and
that (ii) nothing is green and black in the same time—that b is not a raven. So, as
a first thing to note, the situation is not fully symmetrical. To observe that some
(given) raven is black confirms H. To observe that some (given) leaf is green does,
however, not confirm H ′. What confirms H ′, and thus H, is the observation that
some (given) non-black entity (e.g. something green) is not a raven (but a leaf).
This apparent asymmetry is also revealed by a more detailed analysis. Setting
Key Proposition
E1 Object a is black.
A1 Object a is a raven.
E2 Object b is a leaf.
E3 Object b is not a raven.
A4 Object b is green.
A5 Nothing is black and green in the same time.
A6 Nothing is a leaf and a raven in the same time.
the dialectical structure in figure 3 depicts the inferential relations that hold between
the various pieces of evidence and the hypothesis H. Specifically, H entails the items
15Bayes’ theorem, in its simplest variant, reads,
P (H|E) = P (E|H)× P (H)
P (E)
.
We thus have,
P (H|E)
P (H)
∝ P (E|H).
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Doj(H|Ei) = Doj(H|Ei)Doj(H) × Doj(H)
i = 1 0.47 1.18 0.40
i = 2 0.41 1.02 0.40
Figure 3: Argument map depicting the dialectical structure of the raven paradox.
The table gives the corresponding degrees of partial entailment and degrees of con-
firmation.
E1 and E3—namely via A1, and via A4 and A5, respectively. E3, in turn, is backed
by the argument (E2,A6;E3). Relative to this dialectical structure, degrees of partial
entailment and degrees of confirmation can be calculated16; results are displayed in
the table in figure 3. The hypothesis H is entailed by E1 to a higher degree than
by E2. Likewise, the degree of confirmation of H by E1 is significantly higher than
by E2. Still, E2 does positively confirm H, albeit to a very small degree. Thus,
the raven paradox is solved: Observing that some raven is black confirms the raven
hypothesis H to a higher degree than observing that some green object is a leaf—
notwithstanding that the latter lends some minimal support to H, too.17
Grue paradox. A resolution of the grue paradox, understood as an objection
to the hypothetico-deductive account of confirmation, should begin by stressing
that theory-confirmation, as well as theory-choice, is always carried out (a) against
some body of (theoretical) background knowledge and (b) with regard to a finite,
contingently composed set of alternatives. The purpose of a philosophical theory
16For this as well as the following numerical calculations see the supplementary material.
17It might be objected that A5 and A6 should count as background knowledge. That would,
indeed, make the dialectic situation symmetrical and E2 (resp. E3) confirmed H to the same degree
as E1. Note, however, that even in this case, H is not at all confirmed by the observation that some
object x, which is a leaf (non-raven), is actually green (non-black); but only by the observation that
some green (non-black) entity is not a raven and hence no counter-example to H. In the end, this
doesn’t seem to be highly paradoxical.
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¬H2
H2
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B
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B
H1
H1
A1
E
H2
A2
E
Doj(Hi|E) = Doj(Hi|E)Doj(Hi) × Doj(Hi)
i = 1 0.80 1.03 0.77
i = 2 0.10 1.03 0.097
Figure 4: Argument map depicting the dialectical structure of the grue paradox.
The table gives the corresponding degrees of partial entailment and degrees of con-
firmation.
of confirmation, we take it, is not to explain and justify how empirical data—and
empirical data alone—may support theoretical hypotheses. On the contrary, such
a theory must clarify how empirical data, given some background knowledge, may
lent support to one hypothesis, compared to a set of rivals.
This said, the grue paradox can be resolved by explicitly including the theoretical
arguments for (or against) the rival hypotheses, i.e. the support ‘from above’, into
the analysis. In contrast to a similar strategy discussed by Goodman [1983, p. 77]
himself—namely to determine the lawlikeness of a general statement in terms of its
overall theoretical support so as to set apart the lawlike statement that all emer-
alds are green (H1) from the merely accidental claim that they are grue (H2)—we
suggest to take the theoretical support directly into account in the dialectical anal-
ysis, without touching the concept of lawlikeness. Let us consider, to spell out this
idea, Goodman’s example in some more detail. The relevant background knowledge
which determines the overall belief-worthiness of H1 and H2 comprises, for instance,
the claim that the optic properties of materials supervene on their molecular or
atomic structure. The colour of a stone therefore simply doesn’t depend on when
we observe it. In a dialectical analysis, this general background knowledge translates
into a theoretical argument in favour of H1 (or, alternatively, an argument against
H2). Apart from the theoretical support for H1, the rival hypotheses entail, by con-
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D
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Doj(Hi|E) = Doj(Hi|E)Doj(Hi) × Doj(Hi)
i = 1 0.59 1.14 0.52
i = 2 0.18 1.14 0.16
i = 3 0.53 1.02 0.52
Figure 5: Argument map depicting the dialectical structure of the tacking para-
dox. The table gives the corresponding degrees of partial entailment and degrees of
confirmation with H1 := H, H2 := H&C and H3 := C.
struction, the same available evidence E. Figure 4 depicts the respective dialectical
structure. The theoretical arguments which back H1 rely on auxiliary assumption
A3, . . . , A5 as well as some background knowledge abbreviated by “B”. The ar-
guments (H1,A1;E) and (H2,A2;E) state that both hypotheses entail the available
evidence. As the corresponding table reports, the evidence E confirms H1 as much
as H2. The degree of justification of H1 given E, however, is significantly higher
than of H2—a fact entirely due to H1’s greater prior degree of justification. So even
though the empirical evidence confirms both hypotheses to the same degree, H1 is,
generally, much better justified. Refined hypothetico-deductivism gives by no means
rise to the contrary-to-fact implication that H1 and H2 are, all things considered,
equally well supported.18
Tacking paradox. Consider a situation as described in the tacking paradox above.
We shall assume that claim C, conjoined to the original hypothesis H, is neither
18Along this general line of reasoning, we may equally solve the additional illustrative riddle
Goodman mentions to exemplify his paradox [Goodman, 1983, p. 73]. So, why does observing that
a given piece of copper conducts electricity (E1) confirm the hypothesis that copper is conductive
(H1), whereas observing that a man in this room is a third son (E2) does not confirm, or so it seems,
the hypothesis that all men in this room are third sons (H2)? The answer is that, contrary to one’s
first impression, both pieces of evidence do lend support to the respective hypothesis. In spite of
this fact, however, H1 is, all things considered, more belief-worthy than H2 because of additional
theoretical support for H1 (all metals are conductors) as well as theoretical objections to H2 (less
than x% of all parents have 3 sons) and, possibly, direct evidential disconfirmation of H2 (this man
over there pretends to have no siblings).
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Doj(Hi|e) = Doj(Hi|e)Doj(Hi) × Doj(Hi)
i = 1 0.6 1.05 0.57
i = 2 0.5 1.0 0.5
Figure 6: Argument map depicting the dialectical structure of the paradox from con-
ceptual difference. The table gives the corresponding degrees of partial entailment
and degrees of confirmation.
empirically empty nor empirically equivalent with H, i.e. C has observational impli-
cations, say D, which are not implied by H. Consequently, the conjoined hypothesis
H&C implies observational statements D as well as E whereas H implies E only.
Figure 5 represents these inferential relations by a dialectical structure, presuming
that the derivation of E and D relies on some auxiliary assumptions. As can be
seen from the corresponding table, E increases, as a matter of fact, the prior degree
of justification of the simple hypothesis H (that is: confirms H) to the same degree
as the conjoined hypothesis H&C. Yet, the individual hypotheses C receives much
less empirical confirmation from E than H or H&C. Moreover, the simpler hypoth-
esis displays, because of ample prior justification, the greatest conditional degree
of justification given E and is, in particular, far better justified than the conjoined
hypothesis.19
Paradox from conceptual difference. In order to solve the paradox from con-
ceptual difference, we will show that, according to the dialectic account, H1 is con-
firmed by the piece of evidence e although H1 doesn’t imply e. Figure 6 contains
19This solution resembles the Bayesian response to the tacking paradox inasmuch as it is accepted
that even irrelevant conjunctions receive some (albeit marginal) empirical support [cf. Hawthorne
and Fitelson, 2004].
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A4
B
E1
H2
A3
B
E1
H1
E1 E2
H1
A1
E1
A5
B
¬E2
H2
A2
E2
A6
B
¬E2
Doj(Hi|Ei) = Doj(Hi|Ei)Doj(Hi) × Doj(Hi)
i = 1 0.5 1.06 0.47
i = 2 0.5 1.33 0.38
Figure 7: Argument map depicting the dialectical structure of the problem of nov-
elty. Note that the dialectical structure consists of two independent sub-structures,
and that the hypotheses H1 and H2 don’t represent rivals. The table gives the
corresponding degrees of partial entailment and degrees of confirmation.
a reconstruction of the dialectical situation pictured in the problem set-up. Since
H1 and H2 possess the same empirical implications, E, and since we’re not going to
investigate how any hypothesis is confirmed by that very evidence, we may disregard
E for the sake of simplicity in our analysis. Again, “B” refers to background assump-
tions which are taken for granted. Note that because H1 and H2 are “conceptually
distinct”, the general theory T implies H1 without entailing H2. As the respective
table details, the individual item of evidence e imparts indeed some positive backing
to the hypothesis H1, increasing its prior degree of justification by 5%.
Problem of novelty. We shall demonstrate that refined hypothetico-deductivism
can take novelty into account when assessing the confirmatory impact of some evi-
dence. In order to do so, we consider two independent situations. In our first case,
some hypothesis H1 implies a true, albeit expected item of evidence E1. In the sec-
ond case, however, hypothesis H2 entails the novel datum E2, which—surprisingly,
and unexpectedly—turns out to be true. Generally spoken, the fact that some ev-
idence E is expected, or even well-known, corresponds, in terms of the dialectical
analysis, to the fact that E is supported by arguments which largely rely on given
background assumptions. A piece of evidence E is, on the contrary, unexpected and
surprising, if there are arguments against E being the case. In line with this general
16
A4
B
E1
H2
A3
B
E1
H1
¬E1 ¬E2
¬E1
A1
¬H1
A5
B
¬E2
¬E2
A2
¬H2
A6
B
¬E2
Figure 8: Transformed dialectical structure which results from argument-wise con-
traposition of figure 7.
reasoning, we take it that E1 is supported by two arguments, while E2 faces two
objections which render it prima facie unexpected. Figure 7 shows the dialectical
structure that maps these two cases. Note, as a caveat, that H1 and H2 must not be
thought of as rival hypotheses. Rather, we have depicted two independent situations
which can be compared in order to gauge the effect of novelty on confirmation. As
set out in the respective table, the unexpected and surprising evidence E2 increases
H2’s degree of justification by 34% against merely 6% for H1 and the previously
expected empirical datum E1. Thus, novelty boosts confirmatory strength. Note
that the superior impact of the novel evidence results from the lower prior degree of
justification of H2. Once the evidence is verified, both hypothesis actually possess,
all things considered, the same degree of justification.
These quantitative results can be given a qualitative explanation within the
theory of dialectical structures. As a preliminary step, we observe that different
arguments may encode the very same inferential relations. Consider for instance
(P1,P2;P3), (¬P3,P2;¬P1), and (P1,¬P3;¬P2)—all three arguments basically say that
P1, P2 and ¬P3 cannot be true in the same time. Because such an inferential relation
can be represented by different arguments, different dialectical structures, too, may
encode the very same inferential relations. Specifically, replacing one argument in
τ by a contrapositive variant yields an equivalent dialectical structure τ ′ such that
a position is dialectically coherent in τ iff it is coherent in τ ′. Given these general,
preparatory remarks, it is plain that the dialectical structure depicted in figure 8
is equivalent to the one shown in figure 7. In the transformed dialectical structure
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(figure 8), each hypothesis is directly attacked by an argument. But while the argu-
ment against H1 is, in turn, attacked by two counter-arguments, thus weakening the
direct objection, the argument attacking H2 is backed, and thereby strengthened, by
two additional arguments. The two direct objections against H1 and H2 rely on the
assumption that the corresponding evidence (E1 and E2, respectively) is false. Thus,
verifying these items of evidence eclipses the objections: Establishing E1 blocks the
comparatively weak objection to H1, establishing E2 shuts off the relatively strong
argument against H2. Comprehensibly, validating E2 has therefore a higher confir-
matory impact than validating E1. Moreover, once both direct counter-arguments
are eclipsed, the two hypotheses, facing no further objections, are, in terms of degree
of justification, on a par.
6 Conclusion
This paper argued that modifying the H-D account of confirmation in the light of
recent advances in argumentation theory allows one to resolve the paradoxes which
beset hypothetico-deductivism. We may identify, more specifically, two points which
have proven crucial in alleviating the problems: This is, firstly, the introduction of
the concept of degree of partial entailment which, in turn, enabled us to set forth a
quantitative notion of degree of confirmation; and, secondly, the neat conceptual dis-
tinction between (i) the evidential support some observation bestows on a hypothesis
and (ii) the overall belief-worthiness (all things considered) of a hypothesis.
The credibility of the formal analysis put forward in this paper could be greatly
enhanced by concrete case-studies which consist in reconstructions of scientific de-
bates and which show the abstract confirmatory mechanism at work. That research
could, e.g., address the interplay between inductive and deductive argumentation in
real scientific controversies.
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H*************General functions***************LH*doj of p in tau*L
DOJ@p_, tau_D :=
SatisfiabilityCount@tau && pD ê SatisfiabilityCount@tauD;H*conditional doj of p given q in tau*L
DOJ@p_, q_, tau_D := DOJ@p, tau && qD;H**********Calculation of DOJs for RavenParadox**********L
: >;
H*Set up the boolean constraints*L
ClearAll@tau, a1, a2, a3, a4, a5, a6D;
a1 = HH && A1L fl E1;
a2 = HH && A4 && A5L fl E3;
a3 = HE2 && A6L fl E3;
tau = a1 && a2 && a3;H*DOJs as in figure 3*L
TableFormB DOJ@H, E1, tauD DOJ@H, E1, tauD ê DOJ@H, tauD DOJ@H, tauDDOJ@H, E2, tauD DOJ@H, E2, tauD ê DOJ@H, tauD DOJ@H, tauD ,
TableHeadings Ø 8None, 8"PHH»EiL=", "PHH»EiLêPHHL*", "PHHL"<<F
PHH»EiL= PHH»EiLêPHHL* PHHL
25
53
187
159
75
187
11
27
2057
2025
75
187
TableForm@N@%D, TableHeadings Ø 8None, 8"PHH»EiL=", "PHH»EiLêPHHL*", "PHHL"<<D
PHH»EiL= PHH»EiLêPHHL* PHHL
0.471698 1.1761 0.40107
0.407407 1.0158 0.40107
H**********Calculation of DOJs for Grue Paradox**********L
: >;
H*Set up the boolean constraints*L
ClearAll@tau, a1, a2, a3, a4, a5, a6D;
a1 = HH1 && BL fl ! H2;
a2 = HH1 && A1L fl E;
a3 = HH2 && A2L fl E;
a4 = HA3 && BL fl H1;
a5 = HA4 && BL fl H1;
a6 = HA5 && BL fl H1;
tau = a1 && a2 && a3 && a4 && a5 && a6 ;H*DOJs as in figure 4*L
TableFormB DOJ@H1, E && B, tauD DOJ@H1, E && B, tauD ê DOJ@H1, B, tauD DOJ@H1, B, tauDDOJ@H2, E && B, tauD DOJ@H2, E && B, tauD ê DOJ@H2, B, tauD DOJ@H2, B, tauD ,
TableHeadings Ø 8None, 8"PHHi»EL=", "PHHi»ELêPHHiL*", "PHHiL"<<F
PHHi»EL= PHHi»ELêPHHiL* PHHiL
4
5
31
30
24
31
1
10
31
30
3
31
TableForm@N@%D, TableHeadings Ø 8None, 8"PHHi»EL=", "PHHi»ELêPHHiL*", "PHHiL"<<D
PHHi»EL= PHHi»ELêPHHiL* PHHiL
0.8 1.03333 0.774194
0.1 1.03333 0.0967742
2   dojs_HD_paradoxes.nb
H**********Calculation of DOJs for tacking paradox 09ê2011**********L
: >;
H*Set up the boolean constraints*LH*H1 = H; H2 = H&C*L
ClearAll@tau, a1, a2, a3, a4, a5, a6D;
a1 = HH1 && A1L fl E;
a2 = HH2 && A1L fl E;
a3 = HH2 && A2L fl D;
a4 = HH3 && A2L fl D;
a5 = H2 fl H3;
a6 = H2 fl H1;
tau = a1 && a2 && a3 && a4 && a5 && a6;H*DOJs as in figure 5*L
TableFormB DOJ@H1, E, tauD DOJ@H1, E, tauD ê DOJ@H1, tauD DOJ@H1, tauDDOJ@H2, E, tauD DOJ@H2, E, tauD ê DOJ@H2, tauD DOJ@H2, tauD
DOJ@H3, E, tauD DOJ@H3, E, tauD ê DOJ@H3, tauD DOJ@H3, tauD ,
TableHeadings Ø 8None, 8"PHHi»EL=", "PHHi»ELêPHHiL*", "PHHiL"<<F
PHHi»EL= PHHi»ELêPHHiL* PHHiL
10
17
58
51
15
29
3
17
58
51
9
58
9
17
87
85
15
29
TableForm@N@%D, TableHeadings Ø 8None, 8"PHHi»EL=", "PHHi»ELêPHHiL*", "PHHiL"<<D
PHHi»EL= PHHi»ELêPHHiL* PHHiL
0.588235 1.13725 0.517241
0.176471 1.13725 0.155172
0.529412 1.02353 0.517241H**********Calculation of DOJs for footnote 12**********LH*Set up the boolean constraints*LH*H1 = H; H2 = H&C*L
ClearAll@tau, a1, a2, a3, a4, a5, a6D;
a1 = HH1 && BL fl E;
a2 = H2 fl H1;
a3 = H2 fl C;
tau = a1 && a2 && a3;
Print@"PHH»ELêPHHL=", N@DOJ@H1, E && B, tauD ê DOJ@H1, B, tauDDD;
Print@"PHH&C»ELêPHH&CL=", N@DOJ@H2, E && B, tauD ê DOJ@H2, B, tauDDD;
Print@"PHC»ELêPHCL=", N@DOJ@C, E && B, tauD ê DOJ@C, B, tauDDD;
PHH»ELêPHHL=1.4
PHH&C»ELêPHH&CL=1.4
PHC»ELêPHCL=1.05
dojs_HD_paradoxes.nb   3
H**********Calculation of DOJs for paradox from concept. diff.**********L
: >;
H*Set up the boolean constraints*LH*H1 = H; H2 = H&C*L
ClearAll@tau, a1, a2, a3, a4, a5, a6D;
a1 = HT && BL fl H1;
a2 = HT && BL fl H;
a3 = HH && BL fl E;
tau = a1 && a2 && a3;H*DOJs as in figure 6*L
TableFormB DOJ@H1, E && B, tauD DOJ@H1, E && B, tauD ê DOJ@H1, B, tauD DOJ@H1, B, tauD1 ê 2 1 1 ê 2 ,
TableHeadings Ø 8None, 8"PHHi»eL=", "PHHi»eLêPHHiL*", "PHHiL"<<F
PHHi»eL= PHHi»eLêPHHiL* PHHiL
3
5
21
20
4
7
1
2 1
1
2
TableForm@N@%D, TableHeadings Ø 8None, 8"PHHi»eL=", "PHHi»eLêPHHiL*", "PHHiL"<<D
PHHi»eL= PHHi»eLêPHHiL* PHHiL
0.6 1.05 0.571429
0.5 1. 0.5H**********Calculation of DOJs for the problem of novelty**********L
: >;
H*Set up the boolean constraints*L
ClearAll@tau, a1, a2, a3, a4, a5, a6D;
a1 = HH1 && A1L fl E1;
a2 = HA3 && BL fl E1;
a3 = HA4 && BL fl E1;
a4 = HH2 && A2L fl E2;
a5 = HA5 && BL fl ! E2;
a6 = HA6 && BL fl ! E2;
tau = a1 && a2 && a3 && a4 && a5 && a6 ;
4   dojs_HD_paradoxes.nb
H*DOJs as in figure 7*L
TableFormB DOJ@H1, E1 && B, tauD DOJ@H1, E1 && B, tauD ê DOJ@H1, B, tauD DOJ@H1, B, tauDDOJ@H2, E2 && B, tauD DOJ@H2, E2 && B, tauD ê DOJ@H2, B, tauD DOJ@H2, B, tauD ,
TableHeadings Ø 8None, 8"PHHi»EiL=", "PHHi»EiLêPHHiL*", "PHHiL"<<F
PHHi»EiL= PHHi»EiLêPHHiL* PHHiL
1
2
19
18
9
19
1
2
4
3
3
8
TableForm@N@%D, TableHeadings Ø 8None, 8"PHHi»EiL=", "PHHi»EiLêPHHiL*", "PHHiL"<<D
PHHi»EiL= PHHi»EiLêPHHiL* PHHiL
0.5 1.05556 0.473684
0.5 1.33333 0.375
ü Backup
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